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1. Introduction 
Momentum strategies that buy recent winners and sell recent losers are profitable over short 
horizons of 3 to 12 months (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Price continuation has prevailed over 
time (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001), across countries (Griffin et al., 2003; Liu et al., 1999; Ellis and 
Thomas, 2003), across industries (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999), across equity styles (Chen and 
De Bondt, 2004) and across asset classes (Okunev and White, 2003). While the profitability of 
relative-strength portfolios is not disputed, there is still a lot of controversy as to why these 
abnormal returns occur. Two explanations have been put forward.  
The first is based on psychology and market inefficiency. Behavioral proponents relate price 
under- and over-reaction to cognitive errors that investors make when incorporating information 
into prices. For example, investors may be too quick to draw the conclusion that a given stock 
follows a particular “ideal type” (the representativeness heuristic), and they may be too slow to 
update their beliefs when confronted with new, especially contradictory, evidence (the conservatism 
bias). These behavioral attributes lead first to momentum as stock prices react with delay to firm-
specific information and, once deviations from equilibrium are acknowledged, to subsequent mean 
reversion (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999).
1
 This suggests that the 
irrationality from which agents suffer may push prices away from fundamentals and allow 
profitable mispricings to survive.  
The second explanation relies on the notion of market efficiency and argues that the returns of 
the relative-strength portfolios are a fair compensation for the risk and/or trading costs of 
implementing the strategies. On balance, however, the evidence suggests that the profitability of the 
relative-strength portfolios is not solely a compensation for exposure to higher risks (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993; Chan et al., 1996; Fama and French, 1996; Griffin et al., 2003; Karolyi and Kho, 
2004; Sadka, 2006).
2
 Studies that allow for time-variation in systematic risks reach conflicting 
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 Other behavioral deficiencies that investors may suffer from include biased self-attribution and overconfidence 
(Daniel et al., 1998), and bounded rationality (Hong and Stein, 1999). 
2
 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) estimate a market model, to which Chan et al. (1996) and Fama and French (1996) add 
the return of portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market value. Griffin et al. (2003) look at macroeconomic and 
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conclusions. While Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Wu (2002) and Wang (2003) explain the 
profitability of momentum strategies through time-variation in expected returns, Grundy and Martin 
(2001), Griffin et al. (2003) and Nagel and Lewellen (2003) argue that the momentum returns are 
too large to be accounted for in terms of time-varying risks. It is important to note also that a 
rationale related to transaction costs has been put forward as an explanation for the momentum 
profits. Lesmond et al. (2004) indeed argue that momentum profits have little to do with risk as they 
are simply an illusion induced by trading costs.
3
  
The contribution of this article to the momentum literature is with regards to the time-varying 
unsystematic risk of the winners and the losers and to the role it may have in explaining the 
abnormal returns of momentum strategies. While several studies look at variations in systematic 
risk (Grundy and Martin, 2001; Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002; Wu, 2002; Griffin et al., 2003; 
Wang, 2003; Nagel and Lewellen, 2006), this study is the first to look at variations in the 
unsystematic risks of the winner and loser portfolios. We do this within a GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M 
framework.
4
 The rationale for choosing a GARCH(1,1)-M model stems from the idea that in 
rational markets, volatility is often viewed as being commensurate with news or information flow, 
and indeed, the autocorrelation in information arrival (“news evens happen in bunches”) is one of 
the primary rationalizations of the volatility clustering that is almost universally observed in asset 
returns. The conditional standard deviation term in the mean equation captures the time-varying 
relationship between total risk and returns, and thus our contribution is to link momentum profits 
with the impact of news on returns. We use the GJR variant of the basic GARCH model in order to 
allow for a possible asymmetry in the relationship between the returns to the winner and loser 
portfolios and the volatility. By using a conditional model, we are able to capture the possibility that 
                                                                                                                                                                  
financial factors that are in the spirit of the model of Chen et al. (1986). Sadka (2006) looks at the role of liquidity risk. 
Karolyi and Kho (2004) use bootstrap experiments and a wide range of return-generating processes. 
3
 Lesmond et al. (2004) show that momentum strategies are highly trading intensive and pick up stocks that are 
expensive and risky (small, high beta, illiquid, off-NYSE extreme performers). Besides, the momentum profits are 
mainly driven by the losers (Hong et al., 2000) and thus short-sale costs also need to be taken into account. 
4
 GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M stands for Glosten et al. (1993) Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity of 
order 1,1 with a Mean term that models the conditional risk premium. A number of studies (Nelson, 1991; Glosten et al., 
1993; Rabemananjara and Zakoian, 1993) show that good news (measured by positive return shocks) and bad news 
(measured by negative return shocks) have an asymmetric impact on the conditional variance of stock returns.  
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the risks of the winners and the losers may change in a predictable, but different, way over time. 
This suggests that a model that explicitly allows for risk to be time-dependent might explain the 
abnormal returns of the momentum strategies. Our approach is an alternative to one where pre-
specified conditional variables, such as macroeconomic or firm-specific influences, are used as the 
risk factors in a conditional pricing model. Most such models have largely failed to explain the 
profitability of relative strength portfolios, and thus an advantage of the method that we employ is 
that it does not require any a priori specification of the set of risk factors in order to allow for time-
varying risk. 
We draw the following two conclusions from our analysis. First, we identify some clear patterns 
in the volatility of the winner and loser portfolios. The volatility of the winners is found to be more 
sensitive to recent news than that of the losers, whereas by contrast, the volatility of the losers is 
found to be more sensitive to distant news than that of the winners. Besides, the volatility of the 
losers (with an average volatility half-life of 24 months and 13 days) shows a higher level of 
persistence than that of the winners (whose volatility half-life only equals 3 months and 5 days on 
average). The second conclusion is with regards to the hypothesis that the momentum returns are a 
compensation for time-varying unsystematic risk as modeled by the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M model. 
We show that the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M terms, when added to the traditional market and Fama and 
French models, explain the abnormal performance of the momentum strategies without the need to 
resort to the transactions cost and illiquidity issues that were the focus of Lesmond et al. (2004) or 
Sadka (2006). Interestingly, neither the GJR-GARCH(1,1) nor the GARCH(1,1)-M specifications 
alone could account for the abnormal return of the relative-strength portfolios. It is therefore both 
the asymmetric response of the losers to good and bad news and the conditional risk premium 
embedded in the GARCH(1,1)-M model that explain the profitability of the momentum strategies. 
We also observe a strong impact of old news for the losers, which we rationalize by arguing that 
when a firm with no or low analyst coverage receives bad news, its managers are likely to withhold 
that news as disclosing it would put downward pressure on price. Since losers are more likely than 
winners to sit on bad news, they are also more likely to withhold information. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset, the 
methodology employed to construct the momentum portfolios and the models used to adjust for risk. 
Section 3 analyzes how recent news, distant news and negative return shocks impact the volatility 
of the winners and losers. It also tests whether the momentum profits are a compensation for time-
varying unsystematic risk common to the winners and losers. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper 
with a summary of our findings.  
2. Data and Methodology 
Monthly UK stock prices adjusted for dividends are obtained from the London Share Price 
Database over the period 28 February 1975 to 31 December 2001.
5
 To address problems of 
survivorship bias, we also include stocks that were delisted due to merger, acquisition or bankruptcy. 
The sample includes all companies with at least 3 months of available returns. A total of 6,155 
companies are considered.  
All stocks are ranked and sorted into 10 equally-weighted portfolios based on their past J-month 
cumulative returns (J = 3, 6, 12 months). The decile portfolio with the highest cumulative return is 
termed the “winner” portfolio, while the decile portfolio with the lowest cumulative return is called 
the “loser” portfolio. The return on the momentum portfolio is then measured as the return 
difference between the winner and loser portfolios over the next K months (K = 3, 6, 12 months).
6
 
The resulting portfolio is referred to as the J-K momentum portfolio. The procedure is rolled 
forward at the end of each holding period to produce new winner, loser and momentum portfolios. 
The formation of the relative-strength portfolios is therefore non-overlapping, thus reducing the 
trading frequency and the transaction costs incurred in portfolio construction and ensuring that 
statistical tests are valid without requiring modification of the standard errors. Our framework is 
also more realistic in terms of the behavior of investors than one based on overlapping portfolios 
where they would presumably have to vary the amount of wealth devoted to the strategies over time.  
                                                 
5
 The returns to the Fama-French factor portfolios that we employ subsequently are only available to December 2001, 
which necessitates this truncation of our sample period.  
6
 We also employed holding periods of 15 months’ duration, but the results were qualitatively identical to those 
employing a 12-month horizon and are therefore not reported. 
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Traditionally, performance has been measured by regressing a portfolio’s returns on a set of 
systematic risk factors emanating from the CAPM of Sharpe (1964) or the three-factor model of 
Fama and French (1993), which can be expressed respectively as 
  tftMtt RRR          (1) 
  tttftMtt hHMLsSMBRRR       (2) 
where Rt is either the return on the momentum portfolio or the return of the winner and loser 
portfolios in excess of the risk-free rate, Rft is the three-month Treasury bill rate, RMt is the value-
weighted market return on all stocks quoted on the London Stock Exchange, SMBt and HMLt are 
UK-based returns of Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market value portfolios as provided 
by Nagel
7
 and t is a white noise error term. The performance of the portfolios is then evaluated by 
testing the statistical significance of the  coefficient in (1) and (2). The Carhart (1997) four-factor 
version of the Fama-French model is often used in performance attribution for mutual funds. The 
fourth factor, known as UMD (“up-minus-down”) is a measure of the return to momentum 
portfolios. The key distinction between this approach and what we propose here is that we are 
trying to explain the profitability of momentum portfolios using a previously unexamined measure 
of risk, whereas the UMD term uses momentum to explain the returns from other strategies. Thus, 
in our study, momentum is the explained variable whereas in the Carhart model, it is an explanatory 
variable. 
Embedded in equations (1) and (2) is the assumption that  2,0~  Nt  and, thus, that there 
is no conditional volatility in the market. Since Engle (1982), numerous studies have been written 
on the family of GARCH models (Poon and Granger, 2003; Andersen et al., 2006; Bauwens et al., 
2006). The attractiveness of the GARCH models stems from the fact that they model the conditional 
variance of asset returns by taking into account persistence in volatility (where volatility shocks 
today influence expected volatility many months from now) and “leverage effects” (where negative 
return shocks impact volatility more than positive return shocks of the same magnitude). These two 
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 These data are available at http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/nagel/data/UK_FFFact.csv  
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features are central to our hypotheses that the losers’ volatilities show more persistence and 
asymmetry than those of the winners. 
We investigate whether momentum profits in the UK are a compensation for time-varying 
risk within GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M versions of the market and Fama and French models: 
 
2
1,
2
1,1,
2
1,
2
,
,,,
 

tiititiitiiiti
titiiftMtiiti
I
RRR


      (3) 
 
2
1,
2
1,1,
2
1,
2
,
,,,
 

tiititiitiiiti
titiititiftMtiiti
I
HMLhSMBsRRR


    (4) 
Where, for portfolio i (i = winner, loser or momentum), 2,ti  is the conditional variance of the 
winner, loser and momentum portfolios, δii,t measures the time-varying risk premium, i. i relates 
to the lagged squared error term and measures the impact of recent news on volatility, i also 
measures any asymmetric response of volatility to bad and good news (commonly attributed to as 
leverage effect), 11, tiI  if 01, ti  (bad news, also called negative return shock) and 01, tiI  
otherwise, i relates to the lagged conditional volatility and measures the impact of old news on 
volatility.  
Within the framework of systems (3) and (4), the following two hypotheses can be tested. 
First, the coefficients on conditional volatility indicate how news impacts the volatility of the 
winners and of the losers. In particular, we analyze the speed of the response of the winners and 
losers to news and test for the presence of any asymmetry in the response of the winners’ and 
losers’ volatilities to good and bad news. Second, the sign and significance of  in the mean 
equations of systems (3) and (4) indicate whether the momentum returns are a compensation for 
market risk, the risks associated with size and book-to-market value and time-varying, unsystematic 
risk.  We also test whether the momentum profits can be explained by a simplified version of the 
above models in the standard GARCH(1,1)-M framework. This specification models the time-
varying risk premium as in (3) and (4) but does not allow for asymmetric response of volatility to 
good and bad news. Practically, this breaks down to estimating the following systems of equations 
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3. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. The rows 
represent the ranking periods (J = 3, 6 and 12 months) and the columns represent the holding 
periods (K = 3, 6 and 12 months). It is clear from this table that the winners systematically 
outperform the losers at the 1% level. Across strategies, the momentum portfolios earn an average 
return of 0.0151 a month, with a range from 0.0093 for the 3-3 strategy to 0.0193 for the 6-6 
strategy.
8
 These results corroborate those of Liu et al. (1999) and Ellis and Thomas (2003) for the 
UK.  Table 1 also reports the monthly standard deviations and reward-to-risk ratios of each 
portfolio returns. Consistent with rational expectations, the momentum portfolios with higher 
returns have also more risk. For instance, the 6-6 strategy earns the highest average return (0.0193) 
and, with a standard deviation of 0.0511, it is also the second most volatile strategy. With a reward-
to-risk ratio of 0.3856, the 12-6 strategy generates the highest average return in risk-adjusted terms, 
while the 3-3 strategy offers the lowest risk-adjusted return (0.1925).  
The contribution of the article is with regards to the time-varying unsystematic risk of the 
winner and loser portfolios and the impact that it may have on momentum profits. With this in mind, 
we first analyze the performance of the winner, loser and momentum portfolios within the standard 
market and Fama and French models and then allow for time-varying unsystematic risk through 
different specifications of the GARCH(1,1) model. While doing this, we will also analyze the 
impact of recent news, old news and bad news on the volatility of the winners and losers. 
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 Note that all figures in this study refer to monthly proportion returns rather than percentage returns, unless otherwise 
stated.  
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3. 1. Static market and Fama and French models 
Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of the market and Fama and French models (1) and (2) 
for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios.
9
 In line with previous research (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993; Fama and French, 1996; Karolyi and Kho, 2004), the results indicate that traditional 
versions of the market and Fama and French models fail to explain momentum profits. Regardless 
of the model, of the ranking period, and of the holding period, the  coefficients of the momentum 
strategies in equations (1) and (2) are positive and significant at the 1% level. The momentum 
profits estimated from the market model range from 0.0095 (3-3 strategy) to 0.0194 (6-6 strategy), 
with an average return at 0.0151 a month. According to the Fama and French model, the winners 
outperform the losers by 0.0177 on average, with a range of 0.0110 (3-3 strategy) to 0.0222 (12-6 
strategy). While systematic risk explains most of the over-performance of the winners, it fails to 
account for the under-performance of the losers. Irrespective of the ranking period, of the holding 
period and of the risk model considered, the losers indeed have negative alphas that are significant 
at the 1% level. As in Hong et al. (2000), the momentum profits are therefore driven by the losers. 
The factor loadings on RMt, SMBt and HMLt in (1) and (2) suggest that the winner and loser 
portfolios tend to pick small capitalization stocks (s>0) with high market risk (>0). The winners 
have growth characteristics (h<0) and the losers have value characteristics (h>0). The momentum 
strategies are predominantly market-neutral (=0) and size-neutral (s=0) and have negative loadings 
on HMLt. These results are consistent with those previously reported, including the studies by Chan 
et al. (1996) and Liu et al. (1999). 
3. 2. GARCH(1,1) versions of market and Fama and French models  
Table 3 reports estimates of the market and Fama and French models (3) and (4) that include 
a GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M term. To facilitate exposition, the averages across ranking and holding 
periods of the coefficient estimates are discussed in the following section for the winner, loser and 
momentum portfolios, but are not reported directly in the Table due to space constraints. The 
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 Engle (1982)’s ARCH-LM test provides strong evidence of heteroscedasticity in the OLS residuals of the market and 
Fama-French models. Hence, we use White’s heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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estimation method is Maximum Likelihood with Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. We 
first analyze how news, whether it is recent, distant or negative, impacts the volatility of the winners 
and the losers. We subsequently test for whether the time-varying unsystematic risk common to the 
winners and losers explains the profitability of the momentum strategies. 
The pattern of conditional volatility 
The coefficients  and  in systems (3) and (4) relate to the lagged squared error term and, 
therefore, to the impact of recent news on volatility. The average +/2 of the conditional market 
model equals 0.2554 for the winners and 0.1262 for the losers. While the parameters in the 
conditional variance equation of a symmetric GARCH model are usually required to be positive, 
when the GJR form of the model is used, it is possible for the parameter on the asymmetry term ( 
in our notation) to be negative. More specifically, if E(It) = ½, then provided that  > /2, the 
negative parameter would not lead the conditional variance to be negative. We have checked this 
condition and it is satisfied for all models estimated in this study. The average +/2 of the 
conditional Fama and French model is 0.2867 for the winners and 0.1551 for the losers. Clearly, 
recent news impacts the volatility of the winners more than it impacts that of the losers. With only 
one exception (the 3-3 winner in the Fama and French model), the conclusion holds throughout in 
Table 3, irrespective of the ranking period, of the holding period and of the model considered. 
The coefficient  in systems (3) and (4) reflects the effect of lagged conditional variance and 
captures the impact of “old news” on volatility. The results of the conditional market model in 
Table 4 indicate that the average  coefficient of the winners (0.5785) is lower than that of the 
losers (0.7911). The same conclusion applies to the conditional Fama and French model, for which 
the winners have an average  coefficient of 0.5017 and the losers an average  coefficient of 
0.8072. It is clear therefore that “old news” has more impact on the volatility of the losers than on 
the volatility of the winners. Looking at the estimates of  in Table 3, it appears that the conclusion 
holds for the vast majority of the portfolios, the 12-12 winner in the market model being the only 
exception.  
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The asymmetric coefficients () in Table 3 suggest that bad news has different impacts on 
the volatility of the winners and on the volatility of the losers. For the losers, the mean of the  
coefficients is 0.3028 for the conditional market model and 0.2203 for the conditional Fama and 
French model. With only a few exceptions, these coefficients are significant at the 5% level in 
Table 3. Clearly, therefore, bad news increases the volatility of the losers. For the winner portfolios, 
however, the average  coefficient equals -0.1852 for the conditional market model and 0.0949 for 
the conditional Fama and French model, with 14 out of 18 coefficients that are insignificant at the 
5% level in Table 3. It follows that the announcement of bad news does not have any noticeable 
impact on the volatility of the winners. It may be the case that stocks whose recent performance has 
already been poor are hit much harder by further bad news than stocks recently performing well, 
which are able to absorb bad news more easily.  
The evidence of Table 3 thus far indicates that, with relatively few exceptions, the losers 
have higher  and , and lower , than the winners. Table 3 also reports the persistence in volatility 
of the winners and losers, measured as +/2+. The volatility of the losers appears to be more 
persistent than that of the winners. Indeed, the average +/2+ of the losers (winners) equals 
0.9172 (0.8339) for the conditional market model and 0.9623 (0.7885) for the conditional Fama and 
French model. For the conditional market model, this converts into volatility half-lives of 3 months 
and 18 days for the winners and 8 months for the losers. The volatility half-lives estimated from the 
conditional Fama and French model equal 2 months and 20 days for the winners and 18 months for 
the losers. Clearly and with only one exception out of 18 regressions,
10
 the volatility persistence of 
the losers exceeds that of the winners.  
The impact of time-varying firm specific risk on momentum profits 
Table 3 also reports, through , the impact of conditional volatility on the returns of the 
winners, losers and momentum portfolios. An increase in conditional volatility decreases the return 
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 The exception is for the 12-12 winner in the conditional market model (Table 3). 
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of both the winners and the losers, but increases the momentum returns. The  coefficients of the 
momentum portfolios from the conditional market model range from 0.2718 (12-6 strategy) to 
0.7616 (6-3 strategy) (Table 3) with an average at 0.4340. 6 (9) coefficients out of 9 are significant 
at the 5% (10%) level. Similar results are reported for the conditional Fama and French model, for 
which  equals 0.4368 on average, with 6 (8) coefficients out of 9 that are significant and positive at 
the 5% (10%) level. This suggests that there is a positive relationship between time-varying risk and 
momentum return: A 1% increase in conditional volatility leads, on average, to a 0.43% increase in 
monthly momentum returns.  
The factor loadings on RMt, SMBt and HMLt for the conditional volatility model in Table 3 
indicate that the winners and the losers have value characteristics (h>0) and are tilted towards 
small-capitalization stocks (s>0) with high market risk (>0). The latter two characteristics appear 
to corroborate the evidence from the unconditional Fama and French model (Table 2). As the 
loadings of the losers on RMt, SMBt and HMLt are typically higher than those of the winners, the 
momentum portfolios have coefficients on the three Fama and French factors that are 
predominantly negative.  
The main contribution of this paper is to test whether the momentum profits are a 
compensation for time-varying unsystematic risk as described by the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M model. 
If this is indeed the case, then the  coefficients of the momentum strategies should be statistically 
indistinguishable from zero when these terms are incorporated into the risk attribution model. This 
conjecture is supported uniformly at the 5% level for both the conditional market and Fama and 
French models. The GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M market model is able to explain the momentum returns, 
since the alpha estimates are reduced both in magnitude and in statistical significance. The alphas 
indeed range from -0.0103 (12-3 strategy) to 0.0093 (12-6 strategy), with a mean at -0.0016. The 
GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M Fama and French model does a good job of explaining the momentum profits 
too, with an average alpha of 0.0004 and a range of -0.0085 (12-3 strategy) to 0.0093 (6-6 strategy). 
Clearly, the results of Tables 2 and 3 suggest that adding a GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M structure to the 
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models traditionally used to measure performance is crucial to explaining the abnormal return of 
momentum strategies. Interestingly, the considerable reduction in relative price strength returns 
after allowing for time-varying risk seems to stem from an increase in the performance of the loser 
portfolios. This suggests that the underperformance of the losers identified in Table 2 is in part due 
to their sluggish and asymmetric reaction to bad news.  
Analysis of results 
Proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis could argue that our results are an indication 
of momentum profits being merely a compensation for unsystematic risks common to the winners 
and losers but stronger for the former than the latter. This line of thought would therefore conclude 
that our findings are consistent with rational pricing in efficient markets. Thus, future research 
could seek to determine why unsystematic risk is important. It may be the case, for example, that 
the time-varying risks are related to industry effects, where certain industries that may be over-
represented in the momentum portfolios become relatively more or less risky in a cyclical fashion 
over time as they go into and out of investment favour.  
However, our results are also consistent with a behavioural explanation along the lines of 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), where information on the loser stocks takes longer to be fully reflected 
in prices. The strong impact of old news identified for the losers and the persistence in their 
volatility are in support of the statement of Hong et al. that “bad news travels slowly”. When a firm 
with no or low analyst coverage receives bad news, its managers are likely to withhold that news as 
disclosing it would put downward pressure on price. Since losers are more likely than winners to sit 
on bad news, they are also more likely to withhold information. For the losers, this converts into 
higher volatility persistence (or higher volatility half-lives) and higher sensitivity of volatility to 
distant news. The results in Table 3 also give credence to the conjecture that, for winners, good 
news travels fast. Managers of no or low coverage firms have strong incentives to disclose good 
news the minute it arrives as this stimulates the share price. Since winners are, by definition, more 
likely than losers to receive good news, they are more eager to disclose information. This converts 
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in our setting into a higher sensitivity of winners’ volatility to recent news and less volatility 
persistence (or lower volatility half-lives). 
We identify another interesting pattern in the volatility of the winner and losers. Relative to 
the volatility of the winners, the volatility of the losers clearly shows an asymmetric response to 
good and bad news: bad news substantially increases the volatility of the losers, while it does not 
impact that of the winners. This is in line with the prediction of the behavioural argument put 
forward above. Since, relative to winners, losers have a higher probability of disclosing bad news, 
negative return shocks increase their volatility more than they increase that of the winners. The 
asymmetric response of losers to negative returns shocks could be explained as follows. Relative to 
winners, the probability that losers disclose bad news is far greater. Thus the announcement of a bad 
piece of news does not alter the volatility of winners (as bad news is expected to be transitory only) 
while it pushes up that of losers. When losers do disclose bad news, investors interpret this as a sign 
that their beliefs were correct, leading them to sell the losers. As a result, their volatility increases 
and becomes more persistent. 
A failure to explicitly model the asymmetric response of the losers and winners to bad news 
might therefore lead us to under-estimate the volatility of the losers, and consequently their 
performance, following a price drop or to over-estimate the volatility of the winners, and 
consequently their performance, following a price rise. This motivates the hypothesis that the 
momentum profits might, at least in part, be a compensation for an asymmetric response of winners 
and losers to negative return shocks.  
Robustness of the results to the specification of the GARCH(1,1) model 
In this section, we test whether the momentum profits can be explained by a simplified 
version of the conditional models. Table 4 reports the parameter estimates of systems (5) and (6) for 
the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Table 4 therefore assumes that the return and 
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conditional volatility of the momentum portfolios are better described by a GARCH(1,1)-M 
model.
11
 
The omission of the leverage effect in Table 4 does not alter the main conclusions of Table 3 
with regards to the pattern of volatility for the winners and the losers. For example, Table 3 and 4 
document that the volatility of the winners (W) is more sensitive to recent news than the volatility of 
the losers (L); namely, LW   . Similarly, the impact of old news on volatility in Tables 3 and 4 is 
stronger for the losers; namely, WL   . Finally, volatility in both tables is found to be more 
persistent for the losers; namely,  LLL  2  WWW   2  in Table 3 and  LL   
WW    in Table 4.
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 As a result, the average volatility half-lives are much smaller for the winners 
than for the losers. Across GARCH specifications, ranking periods, and holding periods, the 
volatility half-life of the winners is 3 months and 5 days on average, while that of the losers is 24 
months and 13 days. 
The omission of the leverage effect however has a direct impact on the significance of the 
time-varying risk parameter δ in Table 4. Out of the 18 δ coefficients estimated for the momentum 
strategies in Table 3, 17 were significant at the 10% level. When, as in Table 4, the impact of news 
on volatility is assumed to be symmetric, the number of significant δ coefficients drops to 3. As a 
result, the market and Fama and French models with GARCH(1,1)-M terms are less able to explain 
the momentum profits. Though largely insignificant in Table 4, the average abnormal returns of the 
momentum strategies equal 0.0125 a month for the GARCH(1,1)-M market model and 0.0079 for 
the GARCH(1,1)-M Fama and French model. These average  coefficients are in excess of the -
0.0016 and 0.0004 average abnormal return for the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M market model and the 
GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M Fama and French model, respectively.  
                                                 
11
 We also examined a pure GJR-GARCH(1,1) – that is, a model without a conditional volatility term in the mean 
equation. However, unsurprisingly, it did not explain the observed momentum profits since in such a model, there is no 
linkage between the time-varying volatility and the returns. Therefore, the estimates from this model are not included in 
the paper, but are available from the authors on request.   
12
 Again there are a few exceptions ( WL    for the 3-3 and 3-12 winners of the conditional Fama and French model), 
but these are extremely rare. 
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To summarize, the evidence in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that it is both the asymmetric 
response of the losers to good and bad news and the conditional risk premium that explain the 
profitability of the momentum strategies. Neither the leverage effect, nor the conditional risk 
premium in isolation can explain the abnormal performance of the momentum strategies. It is the 
interaction between two that drives the momentum returns.  
To judge the relative merits of models (1) to (6), the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is 
calculated for the winners, losers and momentum portfolios. AIC trades off better model fit for 
greater numbers of parameters, and thus a preferred model is one with the lowest value of the 
criterion. The results are reported in Table 5 for different specifications of the market and Fama and 
French models. These specifications include the static models (1) and (2), the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M 
models (3) and (4), and the GARCH(1,1)-M models (5) and (6). or a given specification of the risk-
return relationship, the data always favor the Fama and French model over the market model. This 
indicates that the size and book-to-market value risk factors add explanatory power to the models 
over and above that provided by the market return. More pertinent to our study, the data evidently 
prefer the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M models to the static approaches. The GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M market 
and Fama and French models have the lowest AIC in the vast majority of the cases, and never rank 
last in terms of AIC. These results for the GJR-GARCH (1,1)-M models compare favorably to the 
AIC of the GARCH(1,1)-M. Irrespective of the ranking and holding periods, the static versions of 
the market and Fama and French model stand out as having the highest values of the AIC. This 
suggests that out of the three specifications of the market and Fama and French models, the static 
versions provide the worst account of the returns of the winner, loser and momentum portfolios, 
while the time-varying conditional volatility models allowing for asymmetries provide the best.  
Robustness of the results to the market examined 
In order to determine whether the ability of the asymmetric conditional volatility model to 
explain the results of the momentum portfolios results from some specific feature of the UK market, 
or whether it is likely to be more general, we repeat the entire analysis above on winner, loser and  
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momentum portfolios formed from US stocks. The US data cover the period January 1978 to 
December 2001, and were obtained from Datastream. The mean returns of the winner, loser, and 
momentum portfolios, formed in an identical way to that described above for the UK market, are 
presented in Table 6. There is ample evidence of momentum effects, with the winner portfolio 
average returns statistically significantly exceeding those of the losers for all nine portfolio 
formation and holding periods examined. While the sizes of the momentum effects are slightly 
smaller for the US, they are of the same order of magnitude as they were for the UK. For example, 
for the (12, 12) horizon, the average monthly return for the UK was 1.43%, and for the US it is 
1.12%. For the latter market, profitability is highest at 1.71% per month for the (12, 3) strategy, 
whereas it was maximized at 1.93% for the (6, 6) strategy in the UK.  
Table 7 reports the parameter estimates for the statistic market and Fama-French models 
using the US data. It is evident that the 3-factor model is no more able to explain the profitability of 
relative strength portfolios for this market than it was for the UK. For all nine (eight of the nine) 
combinations of portfolio formation and holding periods examined, the momentum profits are still 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level.  
Finally, Table 8 shows the parameters for the conditional market and Fama and French 
models with a GJR-GARCH (1, 1)-M term estimated using US Data. While the importance of time-
varying unsystematic risk appears more uniformly high whatever combination of portfolio 
formation and holding period are used in the UK context than for the US, in the latter case, the 
momentum profits are again largely explained by the incorporation of the unsystematic risk terms 
into the equations. This leads both the sizes of the estimated alphas and their levels of statistical 
significance to reduce. For instance, when the time-varying unsystematic risk terms are included in 
the model, the alpha for the (6,6) momentum strategy of 0.0134 when the market model is used is 
reduced by 40% to 0.085 and it is reduced by 25% to 0.012 when the Fama-French model is used. 
For the augmented market models presented, only one, the (6,12) strategy, is significantly profitable 
at the 5% level, and none are profitable at the 1% level; similarly, only one combination of 
formation and holding periods leads to significant alpha when the Fama-French model is augmented 
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by the inclusion of the conditional unsystematic risk term.
13
 Our other major findings concerning 
the speed of adjustment of volatility and the asymmetric response of volatility to good and bad news 
for the winners relative to the losers still holds.  
4. Conclusions 
This article considers whether the widely documented momentum profits are a 
compensation for time-varying unsystematic risk as described by the family of autoregressive 
conditionally heteroscedastic models. The motivation for estimating a GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M model 
stems from the fact that since losers have a higher probability than winners to disclose bad news, 
one cannot assume a symmetric response of volatility to good and bad news. Neither can we 
presuppose that the speed of adjustment of volatility to news is the same for the winners and the 
losers. Such a suggestion is consistent with the findings of Hong et al. (2000) that for firms with no 
or low analysts coverage, bad news travels slower than good news and thus, the volatility of the 
losers may respond more slowly to news than that of the winners. Our results suggest that the time-
varying unsystematic volatility of the winners indeed differs from that of the losers. For example, 
the volatility of the winners is found to be more sensitive to recent news and less persistent than that 
of the losers. The converse, that the volatility of the losers is found to be more sensitive to distant 
news and more persistent than that of the winners, also holds. Future research may ascertain the 
precise cause of these findings, and in particular whether they are best attributed to rational, risk-
based or behavioral causes. But we conjecture that the time-varying risk of companies with no or 
low analyst coverage depends on the nature of the information that is been disclosed: Good news is 
disclosed earlier, and impacts volatility sooner, than bad news. Relative to the volatility of the 
winners, that of the losers also clearly shows a more asymmetric response to good and bad news. As 
losers have a higher propensity to disclose bad news, negative return shocks increase their volatility 
more than they increase that of winners. 
                                                 
13
 Again, similar results are found, but not reported here, for the symmetric GARCH-M formulation. 
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Most importantly, we also document that the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M models explain much of 
the profitability of the momentum strategies, and certainly have more descriptive power than the 
commonly used size and value risk factors. Interestingly, neither the GJR-GARCH(1,1) nor the 
GARCH(1,1)-M specifications alone could account for the abnormal return of the relative-strength 
portfolios. It is therefore a combination of the asymmetric response of the losers to good and bad 
news, the sluggish response of losers to bad news and the conditional risk premium embedded in 
the GARCH(1,1)-M model, that explain the profitability of the relative-strength portfolios.  
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Table 1 – Summary statistics of the returns of the winner, loser and momentum portfolios 
 
Winner (Loser) is an equally-weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given 
ranking period. Momentum is a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and sells the loser portfolio short. Returns are measured as 
proportions rather than percentages. Reward-to-risk ratio is the ratio of the monthly mean to the monthly standard deviation. The p-values in 
parentheses are for the significance of the mean. They are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust (Newey-West) standard 
errors. 
 
 
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
Mean 0.0063 -0.0030 0.0093 0.0084 -0.0055 0.0139 0.0077 -0.0048 0.0125
(0.02) (0.22) (0.04) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01)
Standard deviation 0.0555 0.0699 0.0485 0.0573 0.0689 0.0506 0.0608 0.0639 0.0474
Reward-to-risk ratio 0.1137 -0.0433 0.1925 0.1468 -0.0792 0.2740 0.1265 -0.0751 0.2634
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
Mean 0.0107 -0.0064 0.0171 0.0113 -0.0080 0.0193 0.0085 -0.0053 0.0139
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
Standard deviation 0.0554 0.0707 0.0535 0.0562 0.0682 0.0511 0.0578 0.0654 0.0497
Reward-to-risk ratio 0.1933 -0.0911 0.3203 0.2006 -0.1170 0.3769 0.1478 -0.0815 0.2792
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
Mean 0.0121 -0.0041 0.0162 0.0128 -0.0063 0.0191 0.0098 -0.0045 0.0143
(0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00)
Standard deviation 0.0571 0.0638 0.0501 0.0571 0.0653 0.0496 0.0568 0.0635 0.0456
Reward-to-risk ratio 0.2121 -0.0645 0.3242 0.2243 -0.0966 0.3856 0.1728 -0.0704 0.3133
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
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Table 2 – Static market and Fama and French models 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates for equations (1) and (2) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an 
equally-weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. 
Momentum is a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio.  measures the portfolio’s abnormal performance, 
β measures the market risk of the portfolio, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and book-to-market value factors as measured by 
Fama and French (1993). MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. White’s heteroscedasticity robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
 -0.0020 -0.0031 -0.0115 -0.0141 0.0095 0.0110 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0139 -0.0170 0.0140 0.0161 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0132 -0.0166 0.0125 0.0152
(-0.87) (-2.33) (-3.81) (-6.24) (3.46) (4.11 ) (0.03) (-0.71) (-4.59) (-7.80) (4.82) (6.05 ) (-0.28) (-1.01) (-4.68) (-8.49) (4.60) (6.47 )
β 0.7662 0.9660 0.9155 1.1528 -0.1493 -0.1868 0.7833 0.9856 0.8858 1.1360 -0.1025 -0.1505 0.8358 1.0392 0.8237 1.0707 0.0121 -0.0314
(11.79) (26.08 ) (12.15) (13.64 ) (-1.62) (-1.73) (11.35) (22.83 ) (12.06) (13.77 ) (-1.11) (-1.39) (16.03) (29.46 ) (12.24) (17.58 ) (0.23) (-0.49)
s ― 1.0001 ― 1.1143 ― -0.1142 ― 1.0195 ― 1.1563 ― -0.1368 ― 1.0439 ― 1.1184 ― -0.0745
(17.45 ) (11.98 ) (-0.89) (16.45 ) (12.72 ) (-1.05) (17.23 ) (14.98 ) (-0.69)
h ― -0.1160 ― 0.2598 ― -0.3759 ― -0.1529 ― 0.3770 ― -0.5300 ― -0.2563 ― 0.4934 ― -0.7497
(-1.43) (1.69 ) (-2.05) (-1.58) (2.23 ) (-2.36) (-2.10) (4.32 ) (-4.04)
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
 0.0024 0.0017 -0.0149 -0.0182 0.0173 0.0200 0.0029 0.0021 -0.0164 -0.0198 0.0194 0.0219 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0138 -0.0173 0.0139 0.0169
(1.05) (1.34 ) (-4.78) (-7.89) (5.67) (7.03 ) (1.28) (1.75 ) (-5.42) (-9.03) (6.60) (8.13 ) (0.07) (-0.39) (-4.77) (-8.32) (4.89) (6.64 )
β 0.7751 0.9601 0.9017 1.1525 -0.1266 -0.1924 0.7936 0.9846 0.8677 1.1181 -0.0742 -0.1334 0.8188 1.0099 0.8451 1.0899 -0.0263 -0.0800
(11.28) (22.13 ) (11.78) (13.31 ) (-1.29) (-1.64) (11.87) (22.39 ) (11.77) (13.77 ) (-0.80) (-1.21) (15.39) (31.08 ) (12.09) (15.50 ) (-0.39) (-0.94)
s ― 0.9475 ― 1.1450 ― -0.1975 ― 0.9716 ― 1.1375 ― -0.1659 ― 0.9807 ― 1.0960 ― -0.1153
(16.84 ) (12.04 ) (-1.49) (17.19 ) (12.87 ) (-1.31) (17.65 ) (13.59 ) (-0.99)
h ― -0.2210 ― 0.4528 ― -0.6738 ― -0.1910 ― 0.4799 ― -0.6709 ― -0.2395 ― 0.5575 ― -0.7971
(-2.47) (2.57 ) (-2.89) (-2.26) (2.79 ) (-3.03) (-2.21) (4.27 ) (-3.92)
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
 0.0037 0.0033 -0.0125 -0.0155 0.0162 0.0188 0.0044 0.0039 -0.0147 -0.0183 0.0191 0.0222 0.0014 0.0008 -0.0129 -0.0165 0.0142 0.0174
(1.69) (2.68 ) (-4.46) (-7.06) (5.63) (7.02 ) (2.00) (3.32 ) (-5.01) (-8.66) (6.68) (8.69 ) (0.64) (0.76 ) (-4.59) (-8.53) (5.48) (7.73 )
β 0.8525 1.0210 0.8270 1.0435 0.0255 -0.0225 0.8480 1.0232 0.8214 1.0707 0.0265 -0.0475 0.8468 1.0259 0.8164 1.0599 0.0304 -0.0340
(13.71) (24.79 ) (10.89) (11.54 ) (0.27) (-0.19) (13.62) (24.14 ) (10.48) (11.58 ) (0.27) (-0.40) (16.15) (35.74 ) (12.47) (16.48 ) (0.51) (-0.46)
s ― 0.8763 ― 0.9803 ― -0.1040 ― 0.9036 ― 1.1168 ― -0.2132 ― 0.9200 ― 1.0835 ― -0.1635
(16.97 ) (10.73 ) (-0.84) (17.08 ) (12.35 ) (-1.73) (18.87 ) (14.96 ) (-1.71)
h ― -0.2726 ― 0.4346 ― -0.7072 ― -0.2434 ― 0.5625 ― -0.8059 ― -0.2283 ― 0.5925 ― -0.8208
(-2.97) (3.35 ) (-4.07) (-2.57) (4.56 ) (-4.71) (-2.43) (5.13 ) (-4.91)
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
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Table 3 – Conditional market and Fama and French models with a GJR-GARCH (1, 1)-M term 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates for systems (3) and (4) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an equally-
weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. Momentum is 
a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio.  measures the portfolio’s abnormal performance, β measures the 
market risk of the portfolio, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and book-to-market value factors as measured by Fama and French 
(1993), t  is the time-varying risk exposure. The conditional variance of the portfolio returns follows a GJR-GARCH(1,1) structure as 
2
1
2
11
2
1
2
  ttttt I  , where , ,  and  θ are estimated parameters and It-1 takes a value of 1, when t-1 is negative and a value 
of 0, otherwise. MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust t-statistics are 
in parentheses.  
 
 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
 -0.0015 0.0164 -0.0090 0.0106 -0.0028 -0.0007 0.0094 0.0073 0.0501 0.0084 -0.0013 0.0027 0.0016 0.0215 0.0514 0.0178 0.0011 0.0024
(-0.17) (2.48) (-1.41) (1.67) (-0.44) (-0.10) (1.55) (2.15) (2.64) (1.74) (-0.19) (0.48 ) (0.27) (3.11) (10.02) (2.14) (0.21 ) (0.45 )
β 0.7049 0.9410 0.7786 1.0329 -0.0633 -0.1510 0.6659 0.8707 0.7589 1.0316 -0.0436 -0.1760 0.7367 1.0186 0.6933 0.9444 0.0664 0.0191
(14.87) (34.29) (15.71) (15.89) (-1.67) (-3.61) (22.31) (28.14) (19.30) (21.94) (-0.90) (-4.22) (24.08) (27.37) (45.65) (38.61) (2.19 ) (0.61 )
s ― 0.8956 ― 1.0740 ― -0.2388 ― 0.8066 ― 1.1024 ― -0.3119 0.9423 1.0383 ― -0.1345
(21.85) (18.48) (-3.56) (21.36) (22.51) (-4.91) (25.19) (23.53) (-2.38)
h ― 0.0682 ― 0.3588 ― -0.2807 ― 0.1173 ― 0.4939 ― -0.4083 0.1296 0.4544 ― -0.2687
(1.07) (4.43) (-3.23) (2.42) (6.92) (-4.34) (2.10) (8.39) (-3.87)
δ -0.0232 -0.9622 -0.0102 -0.6502 0.3038 0.2897 -0.2304 -0.3971 -1.3282 -0.7437 0.3280 0.3141 -0.0387 -1.1028 -1.3747 -1.1255 0.3497 0.3437
(-0.08) (-2.66) (-0.07) (-3.31) (1.65 ) (1.49 ) (-1.11) (-2.05) (-3.34) (-4.33) (1.63 ) (1.78 ) (-0.20) (-3.17) (-7.91) (-3.39) (2.09 ) (1.91 )
 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(2.90) (2.42) (1.12) (1.45) (1.63 ) (1.42 ) (3.02) (3.48) (1.69) (1.48) (1.64 ) (1.51 ) (2.00) (1.58) (-0.12) (2.27) (1.48 ) (1.42 )
 0.3542 0.1560 0.1181 0.1048 0.5210 0.4146 0.4488 0.4621 -0.0353 0.0822 0.4492 0.4765 0.3051 0.2451 -0.0062 -0.0193 0.3628 0.2953
(3.09) (2.49) (1.73) (1.24) (2.75 ) (2.56 ) (2.52) (2.65) (-2.63) (1.32) (3.45 ) (3.97 ) (2.72) (2.15) (-0.53) (-0.56) (2.89 ) (2.94 )
 -0.2856 0.0013 0.0789 0.1789 -0.4254 -0.3469 -0.0749 -0.1226 0.2155 0.2714 -0.2984 -0.3134 -0.0899 -0.1568 0.4319 0.3321 -0.2407 -0.1710
(-2.15) (0.02) (1.11) (2.06) (-2.41) (-2.26) (-0.41) (-0.42) (3.24) (2.63) (-2.46) (-2.60) (-0.83) (-1.31) (6.97) (3.12) (-2.23) (-1.88)
 0.5871 0.7288 0.8325 0.7560 0.6846 0.7443 0.4310 0.4042 0.8770 0.7762 0.6603 0.6657 0.6786 0.6443 0.7715 0.7870 0.7445 0.7709
(5.71) (10.06) (12.84) (7.88) (6.79 ) (7.84 ) (4.21) (3.18) (16.21) (12.95) (5.72 ) (7.39 ) (8.68) (4.02) (31.56) (11.98) (8.44 ) (10.03 )
  /2 0.7986 0.8854 0.9901 0.9502 0.9929 0.9854 0.8423 0.8050 0.9495 0.9942 0.9604 0.9855 0.9388 0.8110 0.9813 0.9338 0.9870 0.9806
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R 2R 2R2R 2R 2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R 2R 2R2R 2R 2R
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Table 3 – Continued 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
 0.0238 0.0171 0.0665 0.0124 -0.0089 0.0011 0.0083 0.0120 0.0556 0.0077 0.0053 0.0093 0.0021 0.0147 0.0683 0.0116 -0.0014 -0.0044
(2.37 ) (2.95) (3.25) (2.05) (-1.44) (0.19 ) (1.29) (3.54) (4.21) (1.53) (0.98 ) (1.73 ) (0.34) (3.24) (2.86) (1.83) (-0.22) (-0.72)
β 0.7121 0.9063 0.7599 1.0016 -0.0088 -0.1286 0.6508 0.8930 0.7179 0.9755 -0.0357 -0.1303 0.6970 0.9290 0.6563 1.0114 0.0297 -0.0403
(18.76 ) (48.31) (17.51) (23.82) (-0.35) (-3.26) (23.41) (35.16) (15.53) (22.16) (-1.11) (-3.55) (24.31) (30.72) (10.99) (19.72) (0.89 ) (-1.03)
s ― 0.7554 ― 1.0790 ― -0.3684 ― 0.8613 ― 1.0353 ― -0.2423 0.8999 1.0516 ― -0.1348
(25.08) (18.44) (-6.06) (25.52) (19.26) (-4.04) (22.71) (18.81) (-2.27)
h ― 0.0351 ― 0.5217 ― -0.5132 ― -0.0762 ― 0.6217 ― -0.6183 -0.0099 0.5414 ― -0.4616
(0.88) (5.88) (-5.55) (-1.16) (7.07) (-7.92) (-0.14) (5.17) (-6.11)
δ -0.6727 -0.8283 -1.6774 -0.8451 0.7616 0.4445 -0.1124 -0.4970 -1.4994 -0.7812 0.3538 0.3369 -0.0118 -0.7783 -1.7612 -0.8700 0.4165 0.5464
(-2.11) (-2.55) (-3.66) (-4.37) (5.85 ) (2.56 ) (-0.51) (-2.43) (-4.74) (-4.48) (2.28 ) (2.02 ) (-0.06) (-2.95) (-3.32) (-3.96) (2.28 ) (3.02 )
 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(3.20 ) (3.40) (2.99) (1.38) (1.74 ) (2.06 ) (2.39) (3.29) (2.81) (1.29) (1.31 ) (1.53 ) (2.45) (1.76) (2.01) (1.71) (1.53 ) (1.37 )
 0.3669 0.2077 -0.0872 0.0337 0.6100 0.6568 0.5312 0.3356 -0.0775 0.0729 0.4646 0.4326 0.3751 0.2097 -0.0169 0.0894 0.2988 0.2407
(2.66 ) (1.91) (-8.10) (1.21) (6.11 ) (3.13 ) (2.16) (2.34) (-3.69) (1.49) (2.69 ) (2.61 ) (3.39) (1.96) (-0.70) (1.62) (2.20 ) (2.32 )
 -0.1478 0.2377 0.3757 0.2300 -0.5096 -0.6385 -0.3465 0.1933 0.3698 0.1661 -0.4266 -0.3755 -0.2771 0.2078 0.4085 0.1604 -0.2044 -0.1316
(-0.82) (1.26) (4.08) (3.20) (-5.38) (-3.13) (-1.55) (0.78) (3.17) (2.08) (-2.49) (-2.29) (-2.00) (1.01) (2.96 ) (1.65) (-1.67) (-1.37)
 0.4155 0.3368 0.7780 0.8498 0.6198 0.6158 0.4885 0.2825 0.8030 0.8409 0.7403 0.7534 0.6475 0.4660 0.7060 0.8029 0.7768 0.8062
(2.34 ) (2.46) (10.88) (19.40) (12.93 ) (5.97 ) (3.47) (2.32) (13.39) (18.17) (9.74) (9.26 ) (6.63 ) (2.41) (6.73) (11.64) (8.99 ) (11.49 )
  /2 0.7085 0.6634 0.8787 0.9985 0.9750 0.9533 0.8465 0.7147 0.9105 0.9969 0.9916 0.9983 0.8840 0.7795 0.8933 0.9725 0.9734 0.9811
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
 0.0086 0.0240 0.0683 0.0179 -0.0103 -0.0085 0.0172 0.0171 0.0452 0.0113 0.0093 0.0038 0.0011 0.0150 0.0548 0.0208 -0.0053 -0.0025
(1.35) (3.36) (3.21) (2.72) (-1.58) (-1.31) (2.21) (4.68) (2.29) (1.32 ) (1.52 ) (0.52 ) (0.18) (2.87) (2.52) (1.38) (-0.72) (-0.32)
β 0.7515 0.9605 0.6929 0.9120 0.1299 0.0736 0.7431 0.9438 0.6810 0.9959 0.0282 -0.0366 0.7285 0.9593 0.6872 0.9881 0.0902 -0.0151
(26.31) (31.43) (16.53) (18.75) (2.38 ) (1.32 ) (16.12) (34.33) (14.93) (29.14 ) (0.68 ) (-0.85) (26.61) (69.71) (14.87) (34.46) (2.68 ) (-0.43)
s 0.7941 ― 0.8258 ― -0.0873 ― 0.8290 ― 1.0513 ― -0.2256 0.8769 1.0448 ― -0.1735
(18.67) (15.29) (-1.19) (22.31) (19.40 ) (-3.64) (35.00) (20.56) (-3.12)
h -0.0816 ― 0.5744 ― -0.5398 ― -0.0317 ― 0.6272 ― -0.7148 0.0108 0.6901 ― -0.6555
(-0.95) (8.25) (-4.68) (-0.55) (9.70 ) (-9.42) (0.31) (11.33) (-8.74)
δ -0.1314 -1.0132 -1.8889 -0.9683 0.5879 0.6233 -0.3595 -0.6839 -1.2735 -0.8920 0.2718 0.4790 0.0539 -0.7640 -1.4360 -1.1617 0.5327 0.5535
(-0.56) (-3.14) (-3.56) (-4.45) (3.72 ) (3.23 ) (-1.43) (-3.58) (-2.99) (-3.10) (1.64 ) (2.36 ) (0.25) (-2.33) (-2.79) (-2.26) (2.64 ) (2.35 )
 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(2.25) (2.42) (2.30) (1.58) (1.77 ) (1.15 ) (1.72) (2.44) (1.80) (1.43 ) (0.94 ) (1.22 ) (2.12) (3.79) (2.78) (2.29) (1.26 ) (1.90 )
 0.2372 0.2298 -0.0634 0.0150 0.4103 0.2702 0.2945 0.2168 -0.0269 -0.0081 0.3080 0.2646 0.2193 0.0907 -0.0318 0.0339 0.2863 0.2002
(2.57 ) (2.39) (-3.75) (0.41) (4.24) (4.00 ) (2.48) (1.78) (-1.88) (-0.31) (2.45 ) (2.60) (3.15 ) (1.51) (-1.53) (1.09) (2.33 ) (2.17 )
 -0.2343 -0.0053 0.3392 0.2111 -0.3914 -0.3132 -0.0585 0.2030 0.1757 0.2346 -0.2691 -0.1370 -0.1521 0.2957 0.3299 0.1980 -0.2352 -0.0478
(-1.89) (-0.04) (3.50) (2.92) (-3.06) (-2.58) (-0.39) (0.92) (2.12) (2.65 ) (-2.25) (-1.46) (-2.36) (2.43) (2.32) (2.42 ) (-2.03) (-0.53)
 0.7386 0.5574 0.7608 0.8732 0.7772 0.8642 0.5113 0.5054 0.9130 0.8770 0.7880 0.7816 0.7083 0.5904 0.6777 0.7013 0.8298 0.7385
(8.51 ) (3.74) (8.13) (21.44) (14.61 ) (23.23 ) (2.58) (3.66) (18.37) (16.64 ) (12.77 ) (10.95) (6.09 ) (9.69) (7.22) (7.30) (12.26 ) (8.86 )
  /2 0.8587 0.7845 0.8671 0.9937 0.9918 0.9778 0.7766 0.8238 0.9739 0.9862 0.9614 0.9777 0.8515 0.8290 0.8108 0.8343 0.9985 0.9148
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner MomentumLoser Momentum Winner Loser
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
2R 2R 2R
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Table 4 – Conditional market and Fama and French models with a GARCH (1, 1)-M term 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates for systems (5) and (6) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an equally-
weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. Momentum is 
a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio.   measures the portfolio’s abnormal performance, β measures 
the market risk, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and book-to-market value factors as measured by Fama and French (1993), t   
is the time-varying risk exposure. The conditional variance of the portfolio returns follows a GARCH(1,1) structure as 
2
1
2
1
2
  ttt  , where ,  and  θ are parameters. MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
 0.0172 0.0163 -0.0150 0.0031 0.0109 0.0092 0.0130 0.0078 -0.0071 0.0032 0.0067 0.0067 0.0035 0.0153 -0.0071 0.0012 0.0077 0.0064
(1.75) (2.53) (-2.38) (0.60) (1.57) (1.25) (2.22) (2.05) (-1.05) (0.79) (1.09) (1.24) (0.58) (2.12) (-1.09) (0.24) (1.54) (1.14)
β 0.7171 0.9410 0.7700 1.0342 -0.0558 -0.1376 0.6950 0.8734 0.7387 1.0441 -0.0749 -0.1802 0.7355 0.9907 0.6657 0.9779 0.0668 0.0166
(16.67) (34.45) (15.46) (18.26) (-1.41) (-3.23) (18.43) (28.30) (15.22) (27.21) (-1.93) (-4.25) (24.39) (50.51) (13.54) (33.22) (2.07) (0.51)
s ― 0.8956 ― 1.0596 ― -0.2162 ― 0.8078 ― 1.0992 ― -0.2886 0.8964 ― 1.0494 ― -0.1385
(21.94) (17.66) (-3.27) (21.28) (24.30) (-4.85) (27.37) (22.95) (-2.51) 
h ― 0.0685 ― 0.3909 ― -0.3291 ― 0.1073 ― 0.5567 ― -0.5041 0.1340 ― 0.4895 ― -0.3182
(1.10) (4.60) (-3.86) (2.16) (7.56) (-6.07) (2.90) (9.58) (-4.59) 
δ -0.5803 -0.9597 0.1459 -0.3789 -0.0829 -0.0042 -0.3731 -0.4330 -0.0298 -0.4875 0.1000 0.1825 -0.1001 -0.7551 -0.0524 -0.4790 0.0989 0.1898
(-1.94) (-2.78) (1.01) (-2.28) (-0.43) (-0.02) (-2.06) (-2.04) (-0.20) (-3.31) (0.58) (1.10) (-0.52) (-2.12) (-0.34) (-2.32) (0.60) (1.02)
 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
(2.85) (2.56) (1.16) (1.39) (1.87) (1.66) (3.39) (3.78) (0.98) (1.42) (2.10) (1.89) (2.14) (2.76) (1.49) (1.47) (1.60) (1.48)
 0.2416 0.1568 0.1818 0.2060 0.2466 0.2103 0.3767 0.3992 0.1676 0.2590 0.2758 0.2870 0.2742 0.2050 0.2603 0.2237 0.2395 0.1949
(2.85) (2.96) (3.27) (3.22) (2.63) (2.59) (3.53) (2.45) (2.84) (3.66) (3.20) (3.16) (2.88) (2.36) (2.00) (3.85) (2.94) (3.09)
 0.4927 0.7286 0.8114 0.7609 0.7012 0.7349 0.4405 0.3723 0.8274 0.7265 0.7079 0.7033 0.6642 0.5263 0.7110 0.7642 0.7327 0.7772
(3.83) (11.22) (13.71) (9.48) (7.05) (7.85) (4.77) (3.36) (12.73) (10.47) (9.00) (8.05) (8.76) (5.09) (5.70) (13.63) (8.37) (10.42)
  0.7342 0.8854 0.9932 0.9669 0.9478 0.9452 0.8172 0.7715 0.9950 0.9855 0.9837 0.9903 0.9384 0.7313 0.9713 0.9879 0.9722 0.9721
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
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Table 4 – Continued 
 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
 0.0283 0.0150 -0.0150 0.0021 0.0213 0.0165 0.0190 0.0108 -0.0114 0.0057 0.0186 0.0181 0.0091 0.0138 -0.0128 0.0045 0.0081 -0.0003
(2.18) (2.91) (-2.37) (0.41) (3.61) (2.65) (2.52) (3.12) (-1.67) (1.15) (3.14) (3.13) (1.71) (3.31) (-1.81) (0.89) (1.40) (-0.05) 
β 0.7224 0.8992 0.7192 1.0109 -0.0117 -0.1313 0.6980 0.8930 0.7153 0.9828 -0.0419 -0.1289 0.7323 0.9255 0.7129 1.0051 0.0254 -0.0387
(18.86) (47.75) (14.72) (23.67) (-0.30) (-3.31) (16.12) (34.37) (14.33) (24.88) (-1.10) (-3.45) (18.46) (31.52) (16.18) (21.22) (0.77) (-1.00) 
s ― 0.7512 ― 1.0820 ― -0.3124 ― 0.8611 ― 1.0449 ― -0.2304 ― 0.9008 ― 1.0502 ― -0.1232
(24.65) (18.29) (-4.68) (27.49) (20.01) (-4.03) (23.45) (18.88) (-2.13) 
h ― 0.0432 ― 0.5991 ― -0.6037 ― -0.0709 ― 0.6771 ― -0.6706 ― 0.0039 ― 0.5533 ― -0.5045
(1.06) (6.33) (-7.10) (-1.07) (8.10) (-8.58) (0.06) (6.14) (-7.15) 
δ -0.8193 -0.7123 0.1034 -0.4411 -0.1711 -0.0009 -0.4831 -0.4164 0.0056 -0.6419 -0.0413 0.0528 -0.2518 -0.7034 0.0394 -0.5709 0.1384 0.4128
(-2.04) (-2.44) (0.76) (-2.64) (-1.10) (-0.01) (-2.08) (-2.01) (0.04) (-3.82) (-0.25) (0.31) (-1.49) (-2.91) (0.25) (-3.32) (0.84) (2.39)
 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
(2.72) (3.16) (1.41) (1.39) (1.87) (1.74) (2.62) (2.98) (1.01) (1.20) (1.99) (1.93) (2.37) (1.82) (1.27) (1.64) (1.69) (1.45)
 0.2899 0.3016 0.2145 0.1829 0.3538 0.2935 0.3046 0.4324 0.1681 0.1718 0.3023 0.2729 0.3081 0.3285 0.1907 0.1914 0.2142 0.1774
(2.07) (2.38) (3.52) (3.61) (2.74) (2.92) (2.72) (3.40) (3.27) (3.26) (2.68) (2.89) (3.14) (2.50) (2.39) (3.15) (2.59) (2.86)
 0.3836 0.4132 0.7716 0.7975 0.6171 0.6523 0.3984 0.2998 0.8216 0.8234 0.6607 0.6804 0.5673 0.4610 0.7868 0.7920 0.7440 0.7942
(2.32) (3.20) (12.04) (14.11) (5.13) (6.42) (2.91) (2.24) (12.87) (16.19) (6.32) (7.48) (5.07) (2.50) (8.92) (13.79) (8.35) (11.28)
  0.6735 0.7148 0.9861 0.9803 0.9709 0.9458 0.7030 0.7322 0.9897 0.9952 0.9630 0.9533 0.8754 0.7895 0.9776 0.9834 0.9582 0.9716
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
 0.0188 0.0240 -0.0033 0.0097 0.0043 -0.0038 0.0194 0.0174 -0.0204 -0.0004 0.0258 0.0190 0.0081 0.0142 -0.0175 0.0022 0.0090 -0.0005
(2.48) (3.27) (-0.55) (1.21) (1.09) (-0.55) (2.47) (4.56) (-2.58) (-0.09) (4.01) (3.31) (1.27) (3.62) (-1.97) (0.38) (1.33) (-0.07) 
β 0.7668 0.9608 0.7292 0.9202 0.0817 0.0590 0.7456 0.9422 0.7036 0.9677 0.0068 -0.0337 0.7682 0.9475 0.7211 1.0180 0.0714 -0.0255
(18.82) (30.94) (13.73) (28.97) (1.66) (1.36) (15.96) (33.91) (13.72) (21.57) (0.16) (-0.89) (17.96) (27.76) (14.16) (21.96) (2.01) (-0.71) 
s ― 0.7943 ― 0.8104 ― -0.0637 ― 0.8215 ― 1.0589 ― -0.1675 ― 0.8626 ― 1.0649 ― -0.1756
(18.70) (15.46) (-0.96) (23.06) (16.87) (-3.09) (25.63) (17.37) (-3.27) 
h ― -0.0819 ― 0.6079 ― -0.7050 ― -0.0239 ― 0.7065 ― -0.6651 ― -0.0270 ― 0.6457 ― -0.6850
(-0.95) (8.50) (-8.13) (-0.43) (9.05) (-9.29) (-0.38) (7.47) (-9.12) 
δ -0.4758 -1.0101 -0.0826 -0.5962 0.1349 0.4670 -0.4290 -0.6628 0.1762 -0.4581 -0.1593 0.0486 -0.2008 -0.6705 0.1279 -0.5228 0.1417 0.4794
(-1.94) (-2.99) (-0.56) (-2.26) (1.34) (2.52) (-1.78) (-3.21) (1.01) (-2.68) (-0.92) (0.31) (-0.99) (-3.02) (0.64) (-2.71) (0.75) (2.18)
 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(2.24) (2.47) (1.53) (1.14) (2.32) (1.13) (1.76) (2.54) (1.23) (0.97) (1.75) (1.89) (1.42) (1.97) (1.17) (2.25) (1.58) (1.79)
 0.2316 0.2274 0.1965 0.1757 0.2766 0.1391 0.2645 0.3274 0.1758 0.1521 0.2526 0.3033 0.1491 0.2871 0.1411 0.2051 0.1836 0.2010
(2.66) (2.08) (2.81) (2.76) (2.76) (2.41) (2.43) (2.26) (2.75) (2.89) (3.04) (4.18) (1.90) (2.01) (3.04) (2.81) (2.51) (2.50)
 0.5783 0.5558 0.7871 0.8164 0.7060 0.8581 0.4998 0.5079 0.8034 0.8468 0.7275 0.6882 0.7959 0.5742 0.8280 0.7152 0.7779 0.7192
(4.34) (3.88) (11.24) (12.78) (13.92) (14.77) (2.52) (3.80) (10.87) (14.69) (9.35) (9.51) (8.00) (3.93) (11.55) (8.64) (9.79) (7.43)
  0.8099 0.7832 0.9836 0.9921 0.9826 0.9972 0.7643 0.8352 0.9792 0.9989 0.9801 0.9916 0.9450 0.8613 0.9691 0.9203 0.9615 0.9202
Momentum Winner
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
MomentumLoser Momentum Winner LoserWinner Loser
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Table 5 – Akaike’s information criterion 
 
The table reports Akaike’s information criterion for three specifications of the market model (MM) and the Fama and French model (FFM). 
These specifications are the static model, the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M model and the GARCH(1,1)-M model. Winner (Loser) is an equally-
weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. Momentum is 
a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio. The highlighted entries denote the minimum values for each 
ranking and holding period. 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
Static -3.5705 -4.7005 -3.0319 -3.6139 -3.2293 -3.2527 -3.4921 -4.5723 -3.0299 -3.6719 -3.1306 -3.1827 -3.3852 -4.4449 -3.1774 -3.9119 -3.2506 -3.3900
GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M -3.8980 -4.9116 -3.2531 -3.9252 -3.6228 -3.6636 -4.0527 -5.0383 -3.3035 -4.1226 -3.5992 -3.7186 -3.8670 -4.8225 -3.4542 -4.3080 -3.8732 -3.8994
GARCH(1,1)-M -3.8930 -4.9180 -3.2528 -3.9117 -3.5990 -3.6371 -3.9968 -5.0433 -3.2382 -4.0912 -3.5884 -3.7129 -3.8314 -4.8120 -3.3521 -4.2663 -3.8580 -3.8925
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
Static -3.5999 -4.6875 -2.9686 -3.5447 -3.0217 -3.1060 -3.5918 -4.7269 -3.0307 -3.6506 -3.1062 -3.1966 -3.5481 -4.6835 -3.1310 -3.7894 -3.1561 -3.2989
GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M -4.0511 -5.1124 -3.2896 -3.9190 -3.3642 -3.6043 -4.0917 -5.1440 -3.3278 -4.0353 -3.5974 -3.7318 -3.9930 -5.0968 -3.3462 -4.0672 -3.6856 -3.7464
GARCH(1,1)-M -4.0545 -5.1138 -3.1718 -3.8702 -3.4429 -3.5613 -4.0238 -5.1474 -3.2341 -4.0151 -3.5494 -3.6994 -3.9647 -5.0967 -3.2905 -4.0503 -3.6769 -3.7447
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
Static -3.6854 -4.7215 -3.1856 -3.6968 -3.1413 -3.2469 -3.6710 -4.7510 -3.0987 -3.7613 -3.1607 -3.3108 -3.6950 -4.8780 -3.1833 -3.8806 -3.3297 -3.5177
GJR-GARCH(1,1)-M -4.1297 -4.9484 -3.4974 -4.0284 -3.5332 -3.5948 -3.9877 -5.1261 -3.3148 -4.0819 -3.5212 -3.6705 -4.0313 -5.2009 -3.3404 -4.0422 -3.6828 -3.7880
GARCH(1,1)-M -4.0490 -4.9548 -3.3972 -3.9636 -3.4861 -3.5878 -3.9936 -5.1250 -3.2375 -3.9895 -3.5142 -3.6411 -3.9855 -5.1837 -3.2587 -4.0371 -3.6703 -3.7954
Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser
2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R 2R 2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R
2R2R2R2R
2R2R2R2R2R 2R
2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R
2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R
2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R
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2R2R2R2R2R2R2R2R
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Table 6 - Mean return and p-values for momentum strategies for various ranking and holding periods for US Data. 
 
Winner (Loser) is an equally-weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given 
ranking period. Momentum is a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and sells the loser portfolio short. Returns are measured as 
proportions rather than percentages. Reward-to-risk ratio is the ratio of the monthly mean to the monthly standard deviation. The p-values in 
parentheses are for the significance of the mean. They are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust (Newey-West) standard 
errors. 
 
Holding period of 3 months Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
Mean 0.0117 0.0056 0.0061 0.0123 0.0034 0.0089 0.0123 0.0036 0.0087
p-value (0.00) (0.20) (0.05) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00)
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
Mean 0.0154 0.0008 0.0147 0.0145 0.0007 0.0139 0.0132 0.0012 0.0120
p-value (0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) (0.00) (0.76) (0.00)
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
Mean 0.0166 -0.001 0.0171 0.0154 -0.0010 0.0163 0.0122 0.0010 0.0112
p-value (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) (0.00) (0.81) (0.00) (0.00) (0.80) (0.00)
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Table 7 - Static market and Fama and French models for US Data 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates for equations (1) and (2) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an 
equally-weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. 
Momentum is a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio.  measures the portfolio abnormal performance, β 
measures the market risk of the portfolio, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and book-to-market value factors as measured by 
Fama and French (1993). MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. White’s heteroscedasticity robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
 -0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0070 -0.0082 0.0067 0.0062 0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0091 -0.0106 0.0094 0.0091 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0084 -0.0096 0.0084 0.0078
(-0.11) (-1.36) (-2.45) (-3.05) (2.21) (1.90) (0.14) (-1.05) (-3.44) (-4.44) (3.81) (3.38) (0.00) (-1.17) (-3.82) (-4.93) (3.83) (3.63)
β 1.2058 1.1486 1.3507 1.2593 -0.1448 -0.1107 1.2283 1.1585 1.3129 1.2391 -0.0846 -0.0806 1.3144 1.2370 1.1910 1.1278 0.1234 0.1093
(20.19) (13.57) (19.12) (16.57) (-1.75) (-1.20) (22.22) (16.93) (20.26) (16.34) (-1.22) (-1.19) (21.82) (15.94) (22.33) (15.50) (1.74) (1.42)
s 0.8141 0.8650 -0.0508 0.8710 0.8303 0.0407 0.9282 0.7031 0.2250
(3.80) (5.78) (-0.30) (5.11) (4.99) (0.38) (4.74) (5.25) (2.02)
h 0.2004 0.1207 0.0797 0.1883 0.1577 0.0306 0.1919 0.1314 0.0604
(1.63) (0.85) (0.44) (1.94) (1.21) (0.25) (1.57) (1.26) (0.51)
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
 0.0031 0.0016 -0.0115 -0.0127 0.0146 0.0143 0.0020 0.0011 -0.0114 -0.0129 0.0134 0.0141 0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0108 -0.0115 0.0115 0.0105
(1.37) (1.11) (-3.99) (-4.54) (4.51) (4.13) (0.93) (0.81) (-4.05) (-4.72) (4.52) (4.29) (0.29) (-0.71) (-4.39) (-5.10) (4.78) (4.16)
β 1.2834 1.2107 1.3081 1.2218 -0.0247 -0.0111 1.3048 1.2125 1.2572 1.1855 0.0476 0.0270 1.3586 1.2856 1.1958 1.1020 0.1628 0.1836
(22.39) (14.26) (19.05) (15.67) (-0.28) (-0.12) (22.93) (14.33) (19.07) (14.60) (0.58) (0.28) (24.44) (18.08) (19.55) (13.80) (2.26) (2.27)
s 0.7969 0.8084 -0.0115 0.7656 0.8314 -0.0659 0.8587 0.7298 0.1289
(3.72) (4.99) (-0.07) (3.56) (5.25) (-0.40) (4.96) (4.69) (1.31)
h 0.1457 0.1102 0.0355 0.0723 0.1648 -0.0925 0.1732 0.0515 0.1217
(1.19) (0.72) (0.18) (0.58) (1.16) (-0.54) (1.67) (0.43) (1.05)
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
 0.0038 0.0036 -0.0125 -0.0138 0.0163 0.0174 0.0027 0.0026 -0.0131 -0.0147 0.0157 0.0172 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0108 -0.0127 0.0102 0.0116
(1.73) (2.38) (-4.62) (-4.94) (5.15) (4.89) (1.24) (1.78) (-4.94) (-5.63) (5.27) (5.29) (-0.31) (-0.87) (-4.25) (-5.23) (3.71) (4.00)
β 1.3729 1.2558 1.2014 1.1341 0.1716 0.1217 1.3604 1.2400 1.2268 1.1632 0.1336 0.0768 1.3866 1.2821 1.1740 1.1245 0.2126 0.1575
(24.99) (15.65) (17.33) (13.70) (1.85) (1.15) (25.64) (15.53) (19.03) (15.31) (1.64) (0.80) (28.86) (16.65) (18.45) (16.36) (2.92) (1.87)
s 0.7214 0.7224 -0.0010 0.7102 0.7870 -0.0768 0.7276 0.7879 -0.0603
(3.65) (5.07) (-0.01) (3.60) (5.63) (-0.49) (3.71) (5.94) (-0.40)
h -0.0229 0.1280 -0.1509 -0.0377 0.1689 -0.2066 0.0179 0.2117 -0.1938
(-0.20) (0.94) (-0.85) (-0.32) (1.31) (-1.23) (0.16) (1.68) (-1.18)
Momentum
Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner
Holding period of 3 months
Loser
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Table 8 - Conditional market and Fama and French models with a GJR-GARCH (1, 1)-M term for US Data   
The table reports coefficient estimates for systems (3) and (4) for the winner, loser and momentum portfolios. Winner (Loser) is an equally-
weighted non-overlapping portfolio containing the 10% of stocks that performed the best (worst) over a given ranking period. Momentum is 
a portfolio that buys the winner portfolio and short sells the loser portfolio.  measures the portfolio abnormal performance, β measures the 
market risk of the portfolio, s and h are the portfolio loadings on the size and book-to-market value factors as measured by Fama and French 
(1993), t  is the time-varying risk exposure. The conditional variance of the portfolio returns follows a GJR-GARCH(1,1) structure as 
2
1
2
11
2
1
2
  ttttt I  , where , ,  and  θ are estimated parameters and It-1 takes a value of 1, when t-1 is negative and a value 
of 0, otherwise. MM refers to the market model and FFM refers to the Fama and French model. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust t-statistics are 
in parentheses.  
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel A: Ranking period of 3 months
 -0.0248 -0.0087 -0.0115 -0.0133 0.0245 0.0253 -0.0391 0.0171 -0.0207 -0.0133 0.0143 0.0159 0.0005 -0.0073 -0.0064 -0.0189 0.0093 0.0124
(-2.51) (-1.74) (-1.09) (-2.97) (3.40) (3.42) (-2.67) (1.46) (-2.72) (-3.62) (2.84) (3.08) (0.04) (-1.05) (-0.91) (-4.94) (1.51) (1.95)
β 1.1271 1.0513 1.1243 1.0959 0.0346 0.0095 1.1675 1.0877 1.1518 1.0468 0.0559 0.0261 1.2776 1.1693 1.1252 1.0158 0.1040 0.0934
(32.96) (42.37) (13.79) (21.68) (0.75) (0.18) (31.72) (37.89) (29.14) (31.71) (1.45) (0.60) (31.22) (34.54) (28.55) (31.95) (3.20) (2.55)
s 1.0197 1.0474 0.0156 1.0988 1.0313 0.0837 1.0943 0.9380 0.1798
(28.28) (12.06) (0.22) (29.23) (20.20) (1.43) (24.68) (19.43) (3.44)
h -0.0209 0.0848 -0.1052 0.0614 0.0831 -0.1046 0.1646 0.0095 -0.0267
(-0.52) (1.32) (-1.21) (1.47) (1.41) (-1.47) (3.53) (0.18) (-0.41)
δ 0.6379 0.2654 0.1217 0.1003 -0.3409 -0.3463 1.0231 -0.7667 0.2944 0.0880 -0.1184 -0.1404 -0.0399 0.2105 -0.0440 0.3082 -0.0319 -0.1223
(2.32) (1.30) (0.52) (0.72) (-1.96) (-1.93) (2.63) (-1.58) (1.60) (0.70) (-0.82) (-0.95) (-0.12) (0.72) (-0.22) (2.14) (-0.17) (-0.64)
 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(2.43) (2.87) (2.07) (1.90) (2.72) (2.71) (2.24) (1.80) (3.21) (2.30) (2.01) (2.04) (1.78) (7.15) (1.60) (2.37) (1.73) (1.70)
 0.4716 0.4717 -0.0057 -0.0157 0.4838 0.4857 0.2845 0.0550 -0.0036 0.0442 0.5406 0.5203 0.1017 0.0295 0.0250 0.0606 0.2762 0.2412
(2.65) (3.43) (-0.19) (-0.39) (3.37) (3.27) (2.06) (0.69) (-0.18) (0.91) (3.03) (2.92) (1.69) (0.37) (0.85) (1.23) (2.05) (2.02)
 -0.3916 -0.3296 0.4769 0.6649 -0.5105 -0.5105 -0.2585 0.1486 0.2371 0.5284 -0.4020 -0.3968 0.0472 -0.0419 0.1188 0.3862 -0.1068 -0.1011
(-2.31) (-2.07) (3.04) (3.68) (-3.46) (-3.37) (-1.94) (0.97) (4.19) (3.19) (-2.33) (-2.33) (0.58) (-0.29) (2.15) (2.70) (-0.85) (-0.90)
 0.4973 0.4913 0.6899 0.6744 0.7281 0.7202 0.5557 0.4380 0.8421 0.6822 0.6211 0.6320 0.6957 0.4779 0.9009 0.7274 0.6944 0.7330
(3.67) (5.57) (6.36) (12.44) (11.61) (10.98) (3.69) (1.52) (30.39) (9.28) (6.08) (6.20) (5.38) (6.74) (23.87) (11.57) (6.25) (7.31)
  /2 0.7731 0.7982 0.9226 0.9911 0.9566 0.9506 0.7109 0.5674 0.9570 0.9905 0.9607 0.9540 0.8210 0.4864 0.9853 0.9811 0.9172 0.9236
Holding period of 3 months
Loser Momentum
Holding period of 6 months Holding period of 12 months
Winner Loser Momentum Winner Loser Momentum Winner
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R 2R 2R2R 2R 2R
2R
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2R
2R
2R 2R 2R2R 2R 2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
2R
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2R
2R
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2R 2R 2R2R 2R 2R
2R
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2R
2R 2R 2R2R 2R 2R
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Table 8 - Continued 
 
MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM MM FFM
Panel B: Ranking period of 6 months
 -0.0174 -0.0028 -0.0039 -0.0197 0.0192 0.0203 -0.0117 0.0014 0.0014 -0.0142 0.0085 0.0112 -0.2392 -0.0160 0.0015 -0.0174 0.0008 0.0032
(-1.91) (-0.51) (-0.52) (-3.18) (2.82) (2.89) (-1.22) (0.17) (0.17) (-3.11) (0.89) (1.11) (-1.45) (-1.91) (0.25) (-3.23) (0.08) (0.30)
β 1.2400 1.1250 1.1771 1.0552 0.1688 0.1453 1.2786 1.1372 1.0883 1.0537 0.1658 0.0677 1.3557 1.1951 1.0790 0.9493 0.2068 0.2343
(34.06) (40.46) (26.58) (15.66) (3.92) (2.80) (36.76) (42.06) (21.92) (29.77) (3.73) (1.43) (33.14) (38.90) (24.69) (28.10) (4.95) (4.73)
s 1.0736 0.9813 0.0004 1.0342 0.9924 -0.0038 1.0232 0.8273 0.1708
(29.40) (11.67) (0.01) (28.03) (17.17) (-0.05) (25.07) (15.63) (2.44)
h -0.0697 0.2133 -0.0866 -0.1439 0.2158 -0.3584 -0.0299 -0.1060 0.1019
(-1.50) (2.55) (-0.99) (-3.60) (3.36) (-4.68) (-0.60) (-1.81) (1.22)
δ 0.5419 0.1743 -0.1789 0.1440 -0.0802 -0.0923 0.3632 -0.0308 -0.2375 -0.0126 0.1617 0.1438 6.0567 0.5939 -0.2955 0.1752 0.2716 0.1911
(2.09) (0.65) (-1.00) (0.79) (-0.49) (-0.55) (1.32) (-0.08) (-1.19) (-0.08) (0.72) (0.61) (1.44) (1.62) (-1.90) (1.02) (0.96) (0.70)
 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0009 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002
(2.35) (2.60) (2.03) (3.47) (3.89) (3.67) (2.16) (1.59) (1.81) (2.59) (2.09) (1.97) (2.37) (4.22) (1.20) (2.36) (1.94) (1.83)
 0.3611 0.1885 -0.0043 0.1285 0.8697 0.8612 0.2314 0.0120 -0.0230 0.0266 0.5761 0.5012 0.0159 0.3516 -0.0119 0.0261 0.3063 0.2866
(2.85) (3.40) (-0.26) (1.55) (3.65) (3.46) (2.78) (0.34) (-0.91) (0.92) (2.44) (2.31) (1.23) (5.39) (-0.84) (0.68) (2.55) (2.57)
 -0.3564 -0.1121 0.4418 0.6588 -0.7945 -0.7886 -0.2195 0.2999 0.4435 0.7130 -0.5347 -0.4499 -0.0236 -0.0613 0.2101 0.4028 -0.2895 -0.2736
(-2.76) (-1.65) (2.93) (3.26) (-3.26) (-3.08) (-2.65) (1.88) (3.63) (3.79) (-2.21) (-2.00) (-1.17) (-0.44) (2.93) (3.02) (-2.29) (-2.36)
 0.6556 0.7499 0.7618 0.4320 0.4141 0.4164 0.7684 0.3713 0.7966 0.6056 0.5783 0.5684 0.3807 0.2814 0.8716 0.7358 0.7149 0.7590
(6.24) (13.14) (11.89) (5.77) (4.16) (4.05) (9.68) (1.13) (11.77) (7.27) (4.07) (3.52) (1.55) (2.80) (22.67) (10.24) (6.95) (8.23)
  /2 0.8385 0.8823 0.9784 0.8899 0.8865 0.8832 0.8901 0.5333 0.9954 0.9887 0.8871 0.8447 0.3847 0.6024 0.9648 0.9633 0.8765 0.9087
Panel C: Ranking period of 12 months
 0.0030 0.0026 -0.0067 -0.0215 0.0258 0.0286 0.0032 0.0021 -0.0033 -0.0165 0.0179 0.0204 0.0040 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0134 0.0081 0.0073
(0.29) (0.81) (-1.21) (-4.72) (2.79) (3.16) (0.29) (0.43) (-0.55) (-3.55) (2.08) (2.25) (0.31) (-0.29) (-0.27) (-3.09) (0.83) (0.75)
β 1.3219 1.2280 1.0630 0.8895 0.3319 0.2280 1.3202 1.1897 1.1213 0.9930 0.2680 0.1579 1.3647 1.2234 1.1108 0.9746 0.2612 0.1955
(34.24) (36.83) (23.09) (16.85) (6.35) (3.98) (33.08) (40.93) (28.55) (25.29) (5.97) (2.96) (33.20) (39.34) (28.86) (29.91) (6.33) (4.12)
s 0.9638 0.7626 0.1328 0.9585 0.8347 0.0667 1.0089 0.7669 0.1821
(14.94) (11.46) (1.73) (25.01) (16.10) (0.85) (19.30) (16.85) (2.56)
h -0.0862 0.0186 -0.3464 -0.1481 0.1778 -0.4090 -0.0879 0.0274 -0.2614
(-1.81) (0.34) (-4.37) (-3.13) (2.89) (-4.94) (-1.88) (0.47) (-3.23)
δ 0.0163 0.0279 -0.1290 0.2298 -0.1674 -0.1858 -0.0230 -0.0412 -0.2334 0.0194 -0.0212 -0.0278 -0.1309 -0.0068 -0.2326 0.0088 0.0927 0.1235
(0.06) (0.21) (-0.93) (1.73) (-0.85) (-0.95) (-0.07) (-0.19) (-1.52) (0.13) (-0.11) (-0.14) (-0.35) (-0.04) (-1.34) (0.06) (0.41) (0.54)
 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(1.72) (2.62) (1.76) (2.28) (2.33) (2.50) (1.58) (3.16) (1.60) (2.25) (1.81) (1.92) (1.53) (4.04) (1.67) (1.56) (1.41) (1.34)
 0.1941 0.6725 0.0019 0.0140 0.5729 0.6220 0.1834 0.4409 0.0079 0.0238 0.3752 0.4545 0.1460 0.6199 0.0106 0.0516 0.2348 0.1657
(2.47) (1.48) (0.07) (0.43) (2.71) (2.89) (2.47) (6.34) (0.32) (0.65) (2.62) (2.45) (2.18) (1.00) (0.67) (1.43) (2.10) (2.07)
 -0.2081 -0.5849 0.3501 0.4977 -0.5216 -0.5511 -0.1670 -0.2973 0.2808 0.6291 -0.3580 -0.4207 -0.0788 -0.1905 0.1391 0.4295 -0.2212 -0.1517
(-2.56) (-1.33) (3.07) (3.24) (-2.48) (-2.56) (-2.25) (-2.41) (2.59) (3.42) (-2.52) (-2.28) (-0.97) (-0.36) (2.83) (3.56) (-2.01) (-1.92)
 0.7963 0.6000 0.8042 0.7242 0.6004 0.5592 0.7861 0.6202 0.8484 0.6555 0.7677 0.6812 0.7352 0.3625 0.9095 0.7200 0.8353 0.8717
(8.57) (5.56) (29.48) (10.40) (5.43) (5.01) (7.91) (8.71) (15.79) (10.32) (10.43) (6.56) (5.32) (2.40) (29.04) (9.22) (11.20) (14.78)
  /2 0.8864 0.9800 0.9811 0.9870 0.9125 0.9056 0.8860 0.9125 0.9967 0.9938 0.9638 0.9254 0.8417 0.8871 0.9897 0.9864 0.9595 0.9616
Holding period of 3 months
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